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Abstract: 
Using data from the 2002 and 2009 Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) surveys, 
we examine attitudes towards immigrant and ethnic minority groups in Northern 
Ireland. We suggest that Protestant and unionist communities experience a higher 
level of cultural threat than Catholic and nationalist communities on account of the 
‘parity of esteem’ principle that has informed changes in the province since the 
Belfast Agreement of 1998. Our analyses confirm that Protestants and unionists do 
indeed report more negative attitudes towards a range of immigrant and ethnic target 
groups compared to Catholic, nationalist or respondents who do not identify with 
either religious or political category. The analyses further suggest that their higher 
level of perceived cultural threat partially accounts for this difference. We argue that 
cultural threat can be interpreted as a response to challenged dominant status rather 
than as an inevitable response to minorities’ cultural difference per se. 
 
Key words: 
cultural threat; ethnic prejudice; immigration; nationalism; Northern Ireland; Ulster 
unionism
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Cultural threat and anti-immigrant prejudice: The case of Protestants in 
Northern Ireland 
 
The twelve years since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 have seen 
Northern Ireland emerge from a period of conflict known as ‘the Troubles’, which 
had claimed 3,000 lives over 30 years. The process of transition to a stable and 
peaceful society has inevitably attracted the attention of social scientists and produced 
volumes of scholarship on the matter. Within social psychology, the research agenda 
has concentrated, understandably enough, on relations between the protestant 
community on the one hand, and the catholic community on the other. Social 
psychologists studying Northern Ireland have typically asked how much, in this post-
conflict period, these groups trust, like and seek contact with each other, and how the 
psychological precursors of ‘reconciliation’ can be brought about (e.g. Cassidy & 
Trew, 2004; Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006; Muldoon, Trew, 
Todd, Rougier, & McLaughlin, 2007; Livingstone & Haslam, 2008; Tam, Hewstone, 
Kenworthy, & Cairns, 2009). 
Yet, the years since the Belfast Agreement have seen other changes that are 
relevant to intergroup relations in the province. Significantly, immigration has added 
to the previously rather small ethnic minority populations. For example, since the 
enlargements to the European Union in 2004 and 2007, a small but significant East 
European population has also become established. Indeed, the arrival of migrants 
could be read positively as a sign of the ‘normality’ that politicians and commentators 
on Northern Ireland crave. Unfortunately, though, the past decade has seen a rise in 
hostility towards immigrants to the point that Belfast has been dubbed the “hate crime 
capital of Europe” in the national media on account of the frequency of physical 
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attacks against these new minorities, as well as homophobic and sectarian incidents 
and attacks on disabled people (Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 2005). Media 
attention peaked in June 2009, when 100 Romanians were forced out of their homes 
following a series of such attacks, eventually having to leave the country after being 
told that the police could not guarantee them protection (although they reportedly 
returned to Northern Ireland some months later). The fact that these particular attacks 
took place in a protestant area of the city, fuelled a perception that such hostility was 
particularly prevalent among the Protestant population (Jarman, 2008). 
Hostile reactions to immigration are not particular to Northern Ireland, and in 
a sense these events can be seen as reflecting a broader pattern observable throughout 
Europe. However, it may be instructive to consider how racism is connected to the 
particular social conditions that shape life there. Belfast, for example, is not just any 
city, but one characterised by exclusive sectarian and ideological residential spaces, 
whose boundaries are enforced through violence (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2007). 
Furthermore, as we shall explain, the Belfast Agreement itself brought about a 
number of legal and institutional changes that aimed to undo the institutional 
dominance of Ulster unionism. These changes, have provoked a widespread sense of 
resentment and cultural threat that has been termed ‘protestant alienation’ (Southern, 
2007). Our aim in the current contribution is to probe more systematically the view 
that Protestants in Northern Ireland have reacted to immigration with more hostility 
than Catholics have, and to examine why this might be the case. 
 
Cultural threat and attitudes about immigration 
One of the recurring themes in the research literature on anti-minority and 
anti-immigrant attitudes has been that of cultural threat, understood as the sense that 
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an outgroup is in danger of somehow polluting or obstructing the expression of 
defining ingroup values, identity or traditions (Sides & Citrin, 2007). A number of 
studies conceptualising cultural threat in this way appear to confirm its role as a 
robust predictor of anti-immigrant and anti-minority positions. In the UK, for 
example, it predicts desire to reduce immigration (McLaren & Johnson, 2007). 
Analysis of multi-national survey data indicates that a perceived cultural threat is 
predictive of hostile orientations towards immigrants, and of low social and political 
tolerance of ethnic minorities across multiple European populations (McLaren, 2003; 
Weldon, 2006).  
Furthermore, by using experimental designs within representative surveys in 
the Netherlands, Sniderman and Hagendoorn (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 
2004) demonstrate the mobilizing potential of cultural threat. Leading people to 
believe that a group of immigrants will not ‘fit in smoothly with Dutch culture’ did 
not merely strengthen the attitudes of people who already oppose immigration, but 
dramatically increased the proportion of respondents reporting such opposition: from 
a minority of 35 percent to a substantial majority of 85 percent. Thus, notwithstanding 
the particularity of anti-immigrant sentiment from place to place, accumulating 
evidence appears to support a key and reliable role for perceived cultural threat across 
contexts. 
At the same time, however, there is a danger of tautology in demonstrating the 
link between cultural threat and negative attitudes (2007; see also Sniderman et al., 
2004). Cultural threat is typically measured using questionnaire items that specify 
minority outgroups as the source of the threat: for example in the 1997 Eurobarometer 
survey analysed by Weldon (2006), participants are asked to indicate their agreement 
with the statement, “the cultural and religious practices of people from these minority 
 6 
groups threaten our way of life”. Such measures, it is suggested, are likely to elicit 
agreement from anybody who dislikes the groups in question, regardless of the actual 
source of the prejudice. Sniderman et al. (2004, see also Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 
2007) demonstrate the high level of common variance between different forms of 
threat (for example, cultural and economic, individual and collective) when they are 
measured using items formulated in this way. They argue that this demonstrates the 
extent to which traditional threat measures merely tap a generalized antipathy towards 
the outgroup and that evidence demonstrating statistical relationships between such 
variables and prejudice has limited value. More useful, perhaps, would be a focus on 
the states of collective vulnerability that lead the cultural difference of certain groups 
to be interpreted as alien and threatening. 
For example, in the British context, Gilroy (2004) approaches these 
phenomena through his notion of ‘postimperial melancholia’. He attributes the 
persistence and character of British unease about immigration and multiculturalism to 
a collective failure to relate sensibly to the country’s imperial past and its loss of 
prestige following the Second World War. Thus, anxiety about cultural threat is part 
of a wider narrative of deterioration, wherein the golden age of British strength, 
cohesion and moral certainty is symbolised most lucidly by Winston Churchill and 
the Battle of Britain (with the role of commonwealth forces in that moment of history 
largely erased from collective memory). Not only is immigration blamed for the loss 
of the sense of certainty and national community since that golden age, but also 
cultural difference itself comes to signify decline and provoke resentment. 
These themes are strongly evident in Clark and Garner’s (2010) analysis of 
white English people’s talk about community. Interviewees largely shared a 
representation of Englishness as inseparable from white ethnicity and as being 
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increasingly marginalized in multicultural Britain: every other category of people, 
they believe, is illegitimately advantaged over white English people. Such sentiments 
can be interpreted as a backlash against the reduced dominance of white ethnicity 
compared to earlier times, and Clark and Garner note the frequency of tropes such as 
‘the pendulum having gone too far’ in delivering minority rights. A particularly 
telling manifestation of this backlash can be seen in the mythical bans on Christmas, 
supposedly pursued by local councils in fear of offending religious minorities, and 
which are cited by some of their interviewees. Such bans, though non-existent (at 
least since the Puritan ban of the 17
th
 century), appear to be widely believed in, 
perhaps because they articulate popular anxieties over the fact that white Christian 
people can no longer claim exclusive ownership of the British state. The possibility 
that cultural threat may be a manifestation of resentment over the undermining of an 
ethnic group’s privileged status will be our focus as we turn to the case of Northern 
Ireland. 
 
Cultural threat in Northern Ireland 
In Northern Ireland, cultural threat has been identified as a mediator of the 
effect of religious salience on Protestants’ attitudes towards Polish immigrants: when 
the predominance of the Catholic religion among Polish people is emphasised, they 
are seen as more threatening by Protestants, and hence as less welcome (van Rijswijk, 
Hopkins & Johnston, 2009). This provides an important demonstration of how social 
categorization processes can alter the extent to which a particular immigrant group is 
interpreted as culturally threatening. However, we suggest that religious or cultural 
distinctions per se do not inevitably give rise to cultural threat. Northern Irish 
Protestants presently perceive a more acute general sense of cultural threat to their 
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group than do Catholics, which, as we shall explain, is rooted in current political 
circumstances. We argue that this affects their attitudes towards a range of immigrant 
groups that differ just as much from Catholics in the province than they do from 
Protestants. 
Between the partition of Ireland in 1921 and the onset of ‘the Troubles’ in the 
late 1960s, the Northern Irish state was dominated both politically and economically 
by the Protestant majority, who were overwhelmingly in favour of continued British 
sovereignty over the province. In political life, this entailed the hegemonic and 
continuous control of government enjoyed by the Ulster Unionist party, and the 
marginalisation of the (mainly Catholic) Irish nationalists from politics through 
gerrymandering and laws restricting expressions of Irish nationalism. In economic 
life, it meant discrimination against Catholics in the workforce. Military and police 
personnel were drawn almost exclusively from the Protestant population. 
Given that the institutionally privileged position of the Protestant unionist 
population was a central grievance underlying support for the armed Irish Republican 
campaign against British rule, the peace process in Northern Ireland has inevitably 
entailed various measures to bring about ‘parity of esteem’ between the two main 
communities (Hennessey & Wilson, 1997; Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006). Significant 
commitments in this regard include new anti-discrimination employment legislation, 
and a re-branding and re-organisation of the police service from a basically unionist 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) to a more neutral Police Service or Northern 
Ireland (PSNI), with positive discrimination to bring about a police force drawn 
equally from both Protestant and Catholic population. Not surprisingly, this re-
configuring of the officially sanctioned role of the state, from safeguarding the union 
to delivering equal legitimacy and status to Irishness and Britishness, has been much 
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less popular with Protestants than it has with Catholics (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006; 
Mac Ginty & du Toit, 2007; McAuley & Tonge, 2007; Southern, 2007). 
Shirlow and Murtagh (2006) have argued that the new institutional 
arrangements in Northern Ireland impose group competition between Protestant and 
Catholic communities, which are also reified as autonomous ‘cultural traditions’. 
Politics is seen to be about balancing competing claims to group rights stemming 
from their respective needs for prestige, legitimacy and validation of these traditions. 
This often manifests in disputes that carry a cultural gloss, such as the status of the 
Irish or Ulster Scots languages, or restrictions on what institutions such as the Orange 
Order see as traditional parade routes, and such disputes are typically seen in terms of 
a zero-sum conflict between two traditions (Mac Ginty & du Toit, 2007). 
Protestant/unionist communities have arguably not fared well in the transition from 
armed conflict to such cultural competition. Whereas previously they could claim 
effective ownership of the military and police forces in a violent struggle against 
‘terrorists’, they now find themselves competing culturally against a confident Celtic 
revival, centred on the Irish language, traditional music, Gaelic sports, and so on. The 
increasing visibility and status of Irishness is interpreted by some unionists as a wilful 
removal of Britishness from the province (Hennessey & Wilson, 1997; Mac Ginty & 
du Toit, 2007) 
For this reason, we expected Protestants and unionists to report less 
welcoming attitudes towards immigrant groups in general than Catholics and 
nationalists. Following the insights of Gilroy (2004) and Clark and Garner (2010), we 
further predicted that Protestants, who have seen their prior dominant status 
undermined by the course of events in Northern Ireland, experience a higher level of 
vulnerability to cultural threat than Catholics do. We expected this higher perception 
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of cultural threat among Protestants and unionists to account for the differences in 
attitudes towards immigrants. 
 
Method 
Datasets 
The study used data from the 2002 and 2009 Northern Ireland Life and Times 
(NILT) surveys (ARK 2003; 2010). The NILT has been conducted annually since 
1998 and is based on random samples drawn from the population of Northern Ireland. 
We make use of the 2002 and 2009 surveys here. The 2002 survey included sufficient 
measures to test our hypothesised mediation model. The 2009 survey, meanwhile, 
allows a supplementary analysis that takes advantage of a much broader range of 
indicators of anti-immigrant and anti-minority attitudes. Unfortunately, however, the 
latter survey did not include indicators of cultural threat. For this reason, we report 
analyses of both datasets in order to take advantage of the particular indicators that 
were included in each. 
Given that our research questions centre on a comparison between Protestant 
and Catholic populations in Northern Ireland, we included the responses only of 
individuals who reported belonging to one of these categories. Those indicating 
another religion or no religion, and those not answering the question, were excluded 
(a total of 11.6  and 14.4 percent of the population in the 2002 and 2009 surveys 
respectively). This left sample sizes of 1592 in 2002, and 1051 in 2009.  
 
   
Measures 
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Religious identity. Participants were asked whether they regard themselves as 
belonging to a particular religion and to specify which. Participants were not 
prompted with a list of choices, but their responses were subsequently categorized by 
the survey compliers as Catholic, Protestant or other. 
Political identity. Participants indicated whether they think of themselves as a 
unionist, a nationalist or neither. 
Cultural threat. This was measured only in the 2002 dataset, and was 
indicated by responses to two items: “My cultural tradition is always the underdog” 
and “I am confident that my own cultural tradition is protected in Northern Ireland 
these days”, answered on a 5-point agreement scale where 1 indicates strong 
agreement and 5 indicates strong disagreement. Thus, the items do not mention a 
specific a specific outgroup as the source of threat. Items were recoded such that their 
mean provides an index of cultural threat with high scores indicating high threat ( = 
.69). 
Anti-immigrant and anti-minority attitudes. In the 2002 survey, negative 
perception of immigrants was measured using six items. Five of these were measured 
on a 5-point agreement scale: “Immigrants increase crime rates”, “Immigrants are 
generally good for Northern Ireland’s economy”, “Immigrants take jobs away from 
people who were born in Northern Ireland”, “Immigrants make Northern Ireland open 
to new ideas and cultures” and “Refugees who have suffered political repression in 
their own country should be allowed to stay in Northern Ireland”. A further item 
asked: “Do you think the number of legal immigrants to Northern Ireland nowadays 
should be…” and was answered on a 5-point scale anchored at “increased a lot” and 
“reduced a lot” ( = .84). 
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The 2009 survey included a much more extensive set of prejudice items. 
These included social distance items, in which participants indicated whether they 
would accept a member of various target outgroups as a resident of Northern Ireland, 
as a resident in the participant’s local area, as a work colleague, as a close friend and 
as a relative by marriage. These items were dichotomous (1=yes, accept; 2=no, not 
accept), such that combining the 5 items provided an index of social distance ranging 
from 1 to 2 for each target group. The target groups were East Europeans ( = .89), 
other ethnic groups ( = .89) and Muslims ( = .93). 
The 2009 survey also asked about the attack on the Romanian families that 
had taken place that year. Participants indicated their agreement with the following 
statements about the incident: “It makes me feel ashamed that such attacks are 
happening”, “I don’t necessarily agree with the attacks but I sympathise with the 
reasons behind them”, “I totally condemn these kinds of racist attacks” and “I don’t 
have any sympathy for those Romanians”. These items were recoded such that a high 
score indicates a higher level of opposition to the attacks ( = .76). Finally, a similar 
but slightly expanded set of eight items to the anti-immigrant measure in 2002 was 
used in 2009 to measure prejudice towards ‘migrant workers’ ( = .84), again using a 
5-point agreement scale. 
Demographics. The survey included measures of age, gender and social class 
(coded by the survey compilers into nine categories based on information provided by 
the respondents about their employment). We computed eight dummy variables 
dummy variables from the social class categories. All of these demographic data were 
used as control variables in the main analyses. 
 
Results 
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Mean differences in prejudice indicators 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of all prejudice indicators from 
the 2002 and 2009 surveys. These demonstrate a consistent pattern whereby the 
Protestants in the sample report more negative outgroup attitudes across target groups 
than the Catholics. The t-tests indicate that these differences are all statistically 
significant. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Religious and political categories 
Figure 1 shows the proportions of respondents identifying as unionist, nationalist and 
neither among the Protestant and Catholic samples in 2002 and 2009. These 
frequencies indicate that while the numbers of Catholic unionists and Protestant 
nationalists are extremely small, a large proportion– 32.1 and 45.3 percent of the total 
sample in 2002 and 2009 respectively – indicated neither a unionist nor nationalist 
political identity. Thus, religious and political categories are not reducible to one 
another. In the analyses that follow, we therefore examine independent effects of 
religious and political category membership on the prejudice indicators.  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
Identity and anti-immigration attitudes 
We now examine whether participants who categorized themselves as 
Protestants or Unionist held significantly stronger anti-immigration attitudes than 
participants who chose to categorize themselves as Catholic or Nationalist, across 
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diverse target outgroups. To this end we used the data from the 2009 wave of the 
NILT, which provides measures of social distance towards Eastern Europeans, 
Muslims and other ethnic groups, as well as attitudes about migrant workers and 
about the 2009 attacks on Romanian families in Belfast. Missing values on the 
prejudice and threat indicators (less than 5 percent of cases for any one indicator) 
were imputed using regression imputation, with all other indicators serving as 
predictors. 
To assess the relationship between participants’ religious and political 
identification, and their attitudes towards these groups, we carried out five separate 
path analyses using latent factors for the five outcome variables. The predictors were 
all dichotomous (i.e., Protestant vs. Catholic, Unionist vs. Neither, and Nationalist vs. 
Neither) and their co-variances were freely estimated. To determine the “goodness-of-
fit” of these models, we used several indicators in addition to the chi-square test, 
which is known to be very sensitive to large sample sizes, such as the Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). Values 
more than .90 for the CFI and less than .05 for RMSEA are considered to be 
indicators of an adequate model fit (Byrne, 2006). All analyses were carried out using 
MPlus version 4.2 (Muthen & Muthen, 2006). 
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
As Figure 2 shows, compared to those participants who identified themselves 
as Catholic, Protestant participants held significantly stronger prejudicial attitudes 
towards Muslims, Romanian families and migrant workers. There was no difference 
between the two groups with respect to their attitudes towards Eastern Europeans and 
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other ethnic groups. In terms of participants’ political identities, those participants 
who identified as unionists were significantly more likely to endorse prejudice 
towards each of the target group except ‘other ethnic groups’, compared to the 
baseline group who reported neither unionist nor nationalist identity. Participants who 
identified as nationalist were significantly more prejudicial than the baseline group 
only in relation to Muslims and migrant workers. Therefore, although identification as 
a nationalist in Northern Ireland is not unrelated to anti-immigrant prejudice, there is 
more consistent evidence for negative effects of a unionist political identity on 
attitudes towards different ethnic and religious groups. As Table 2 indicates, all five 
models showed good fit. 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
The mediating role of cultural threat 
Having established the differences between Protestants and Catholics, and 
between unionists and nationalists, in attitudes towards immigrants and minorities, we 
set out to investigate the mediating role of perceived cultural threat using data from 
the 2002 wave of the NILT. Table 3 displays the correlation coefficients amongst the 
different identity measures, cultural threat and anti-immigration attitude. As can be 
seen from this table, the strongest relationship is observed between holding an anti-
immigration attitude and cultural threat (r = .35). Thus, higher levels of perceived 
cultural threat are significantly associated with a much stronger negative attitude 
against immigration to Northern Ireland. Furthermore, Protestant participants showed 
significantly stronger negative attitudes towards immigration compared to Catholics, 
as did those participants who thought of themselves as unionist. In contrast, 
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participants who reported a nationalist political identity were significantly less 
prejudiced against immigration. Finally, both Protestant and unionist participants 
were significantly more likely to perceive their cultural heritage to be under threat 
compared to Catholic and Nationalist participants. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
To test the mediating effect of cultural threat on the relationship between 
religious and political identity, and anti-immigration attitudes, we estimated a 
structural equation model using latent factors for cultural threat and anti-immigration 
attitude, as shown in Figure 3. Again, the co-variances amongst our predictor 
variables were freely estimated. The same imputation procedure used for the 2009 
dataset was again used here. This time the proportion of imputed values for each 
variable ranged from 5.5 percent to 14.5 percent.
1
 
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
The results clearly indicate that perceived cultural threat fully mediates the 
effect of religious identity, but only partially the effect of one’s Unionist political 
identity on anti-immigration attitudes. Thus, participants who identify with either the 
Protestant or Unionist community are more likely to perceive their cultural heritage to 
be under threat which is then further associated with a negative attitude towards 
immigrants in Northern Ireland. To determine the significance of the mediating 
effects of cultural threat, we used the bootstrap procedure as outlined by Shrout and 
                                                        
1
 Conducting the same analysis with pairwise deletion rather than imputed values 
yielded virtually identical parameters and fit indices. 
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Bolger (2002). Based on 1,000 bootstraps, the means of the unstandardized indirect 
effects of participants’ religious identity and unionist political identity on their 
attitudes towards immigration are .11 with a 95% CI (.047, .181) and .14 with a 95% 
CI (.057, .226), respectively. Given that neither confidence interval contains the value 
of zero, we can conclude that perceived cultural threat significantly mediates the 
relationship between religious and unionist political identities, and anti-immigration 
attitude. There was no evidence for a mediating effect of cultural threat on the 
relationship between one’s Nationalist political identity and their beliefs on 
immigration.  
 
Discussion 
Our analyses indicate that across a range of target outgroups, Protestants 
report higher levels of prejudice than Catholics, and that unionists report more 
prejudice than people reporting no political identity. The difference in prejudice levels 
between nationalists and people reporting neither political identity is less pronounced, 
only reaching significance in the case of migrant workers and Muslims. It is important 
to note that these differences emerge over a number of target groups, and not only 
those who might be categorized as a religious outgroup by Protestants but not by 
Catholics. As van Rijskwijk et al. (2009) have demonstrated, Northern Irish 
Protestants’ reactions to Polish migrants can be affected by whether the predominant 
religion of Poland (Catholicism) is made salient, thus rendering Poles a religious 
outgroup that is seen as potentially more threatening. We concur with van Rijswijk et 
al. on the importance of particular forms of categorization in determining reactions to 
migration. However, our analysis suggests that the difference between Catholics’ and 
Protestants’ attitudes towards immigrants cannot be interpreted simply in terms of the 
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immigrant groups sharing a religious category with Catholics but not with Protestants. 
Indeed, if one considers the three social distance measures, the difference between 
Protestants and Catholics is greatest (and the effect size strongest) in the case of 
Muslims, who obviously do not share a religious category with either Protestants or 
Catholics. 
We found that the higher levels of prejudice among Protestants and unionists 
is mediated by cultural threat: that is, these respondents see their cultural traditions as 
being the ‘underdog’ and as not being protected, and this perception in turn predicts 
more negative attitudes towards migrant workers. Being a unionist is associated with 
higher cultural threat over and above the differences between religious groups. Thus, 
cultural threat mediates both religious and political differences in attitudes towards 
immigrants. 
It must be emphasised that anti-immigrant and anti-minority prejudice are far 
from absent among the Catholics and nationalists in the sample. Mean levels of anti-
immigrant attitudes among Catholics are well within one standard deviation of the 
scale midpoint, with substantial numbers were in active agreement with the items 
expressing prejudice. Furthermore, as we have said, nationalists in the 2009 do report 
more prejudice towards Muslims and migrant workers than do people claiming 
neither political identity. Similarly, we must also emphasise that both Protestants and 
Catholics tended to oppose the 2009 racist attacks on Romanian families in Belfast. It 
was certainly not the case that Protestants generally supported these attacks, even if 
the opposition was strongest among Catholics. It should also be noted that part of the 
difference in reaction to these attacks may be explained by the fact that they took 
place in a predominantly protestant part of the city, and the perpetrators are therefore 
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assumed to have been Protestants. Had this not been the case, it is possible that the 
reactions of Protestants and Catholics would have been different. 
As a secondary analysis, our contribution is necessarily constrained by the 
items included within the survey that we used. This gives rise to a number of 
limitations. For example, the absence of cultural threat indicators in the 2009 meant 
that we were unable to test its meditating role across the range of prejudicial attitudes 
measured in that survey. It is also unfortunate that the surveys did not allow for the 
strength of religious and political identities to be included in the model, as an 
alternative to the potentially simplistic categorisation of the sample into Protestants 
and Catholics. On the other hand, the indicators of threat used in the NILT survey 
have the notable advantage of not referring to specific outgroup as a source of threat. 
There is therefore not the danger of tautology associated with typical intergroup threat 
measures (Sniderman et al., 2004; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). We can infer 
instead that the perceived weakness and vulnerability to cultural threat is indeed 
meaningfully related to negative outgroup attitudes, rather than threat measures 
merely tapping a general antipathy towards those groups. This is crucial given our 
contention that Protestants and unionists experience their cultural traditions to be 
under threat as a consequence of measures to bring about ‘parity of esteem’ by 
undoing the privileged status of Britishness, as opposed to Irishness, within Northern 
Ireland. 
We therefore argue that cultural threat remains an important focus of research, 
especially on immigration, but that the origins of such threat in political processes 
need to be elaborated. It is insufficient to regard it merely as a direct reaction to 
cultural difference, since this would not explain why different groups within Northern 
Ireland experience it differently. Rather, our results suggest that cultural threat 
 20 
follows from a challenged position of primacy, previously enjoyed by unionists by 
virtue of their effective ownership of the state, but now weakened by the recognition 
of the legitimacy of Irish nationalism. While the context that we have examined here 
differs in important ways from others in which cultural threat is of interest, such as 
Great Britain and the Netherlands, it is this more politicised characterisation of 
cultural threat that we see as fertile ground for future work. 
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Table 1 
  Mean (s.d.) t 
  Protestants
a
 Catholics
b
  
2002 SURVEY     
Cultural threat  3.09 (.97) 2.48 (.79) 13.51 
Anti-immigrant 
attitude 
 
3.17 (.83) 2.76 (.81) 11.14 
2009 SURVEY     
Social distance 
    
Eastern Europeans 
 1.22 (.35) 1.11 (.25) 5.77 
Other ethnic 
groups 
 1.17 (.31) 1.10 (.25) 3.69 
Muslims 
 
1.43 (.42) 1.24 (.37) 7.81 
Anti-migrant worker 
attitude 
 
3.07 (.65) 2.71 (.70) 8.53 
Opposition to attacks 
on Romanian families 
 
3.71 (.73) 4.15 (.63) -10.36 
Note: 
a
 N = 891/547 in 2002/2009; 
b
 N = 701/504 in 2002/2009. Based on the 
complete dataset including the imputed values for prejudice and threat indicators. All 
t statistics are significant at p < .001. Positive values of t indicate higher scores among 
Protestants compared to Catholics. Equal variances are not assumed.
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Table 2 Measures of fit for the five models predicting attitudes towards 
different minority groups 
 
Target group χ2 df CFI RMSEA 90% C.I. 
Eastern European 123.03 55 .978 .035 .027-.043 
Other ethnic groups 130.20 56 .978 .036 .028-.044 
Muslims 250.05 57 .956 .058 .050-.065 
Romanian Families (2009) 65.04 40 .980 .025 .013-.035 
Migrant workers 255.06 108 .948 .037 .031-.042 
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Table 3 Zero-order order correlation coefficients (NILT 2002) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Anti-immigration attitude ----     
2. Cultural threat .35 ----    
3. Protestant (vs. Catholic) .24 .32 ----   
4. Unionist (vs. neither) .25 .36 .74 ----  
5. Nationalist (vs. neither) -.17 -.24 -.70 -.56 ---- 
Notes: N (listwise) = 1564; all correlation coefficients are significant at p < .001 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 Religious and political categorization/identification effects on 
prejudice towards different minority groups (2009 sample)
Notes: 
*
p < .05, 
**
p < .01, 
***
p < .001; N = 1020; 
a
Items worded positively indicating a 
positive attitude towards the Romanian families involved in the 2009 racist attacks; The path 
coefficients represent standardized beta values. The beta values for the paths from religious 
and political identification to the five outcome variables are listed in the same order in which 
the target groups of anti-immigration attitudes appear on the right-hand side of the diagram; 
The observed effects are controlled for age, gender and socio-economic status. Reduction in 
sample size from that present in the descriptive statistics is due to 31 cases having incomplete 
socio-demographic data. 
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Figure 3 Mediation analysis (NILT 2002) 
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